

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 06130 241239Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----036382 241245Z /43

O 241051Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6946  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 06130

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS/CHEROKEE)

FOR SECRETARY AND SAUNDERS FROM ATHERTON; RABAT, JIDDA,  
CAIRO, AND TEL AVIV EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

U.S. DEL NO 5

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP (ATHERTON, ALFRED L., JR.)  
SUBJECT: KING HASSAN'S VIEWS ON ARAB CONSENSUS AND PEACE  
- PROCESS

REF: RABAT 4437

1. REFTEL DID NOT ARRIVE IN TAIF IN TIME FOR MY TALKS WITH  
SAUD SUNDAY MORNING. ON POINT IN PARA 8A REFTEL, I THINK  
I WOULD HAVE DECIDED IN ANY CASE NOT TO RAISE IT WITH SAUD.  
IT SEEMS TO ME WE SHOULD ALLOW SADAT TO TELL US IF HE CAN-  
NOT AGREE TO MEET AT AL-ARISH OR SFM BECAUSE IT IS PRE-  
CLUDED BY ARAB CONSENSUS, AND NOT OURSELVES BE RAISING THE  
ISSUE WITH LEADERS WHO WOULD PROBABLY BE HAPPIER IF SADAT  
BACKED OWN ON THIS POINT. SAUD, INCIDENTALLY, HAD PLENTY  
OF OPPORTUNITY SUNDAY MORNING TO EXPRESS OBJECTION TO A  
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GIVEN VENUE FOR ANOTHER ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE WE  
TALKED ABOUT SUCH ANOTHER ROUND AT SOME LENGTH. AS YOU  
WILL SEE FROM OUR REPORTING TELEGRAM HE IS NOT ENTHUSIAS-  
TIC ABOUT FURTHER EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TALKS BUT HE DID NOT  
SAY ANYTHING ABOUT QUESTION OF WHERE THEY MIGHT BE HELD.

2. ON QUESTION OF HOW WE BUILD ARAB CONSENSUS IN SUPPORT

OF PEACE PROCESS, I AGREE THIS IS IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE. I AM INCLINED TO FEEL THAT AN ARAB SUMMIT IS LIKELY TO CAUSE US PROBLEMS WHENEVER IT RECURS. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE A JUDGMENT AS TO WHEN IT WILL BE LEAST HURTFUL, AND THEREFORE PERHAPS NOT VERY USEFUL TO TRY TO GET OUR ARAB FRIENDS LIKE HASSAN TO SLANT IT TOWARD SOME PARTICULAR TIMEFRAME. OUR BEST APPROACH, I BELIEVE, IS TO CONTINUE TO DISCOURAGE SUMMIT, POINTING OUT TO MODERATES HOW DIFFICULT IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN IN THE PAST FOR ARAB SUMMITS TO MAINTAIN MODERATE POSITIONS. I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT ANY SUMMIT, HOWEVER MUCH IT WAS DOMINATED BY MODERATES, COULD AVOID TYING SADAT'S HANDS TO SOME EXTENT. WHILE MODERATES WANT BOTH ARAB CONSENSUS AND PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE, THEIR DESIRE TO ACHIEVE FORMER COULD WELL PRODUCE RESULTS THAT MADE PEACE PROCESS MORE DIFFICULT IN TERMS OF BRINGING ISRAELIS ALONG.

3. ON THE OTHER HAND WE SHOULD, AS SUGGESTED IN HAL SAUNDERS' MESSAGE, CONTINUE TO URGE OUR FRIENDS TO WORK HARD TO BUILD AN ARAB CONSENSUS TO SUPPORT PEACE PROCESS OR AT LEAST NEUTRALIZE OPPOSITION TO IT. BEST WAY TO DO THIS, I BELIEVE, IS THROUGH ENCOURAGING USE OF EMISSARIES AT CRUCIAL POINTS IN NEGOTIATIONS AND BY SUCH HELPFUL INTERVENTION AS AMBASSADOR EILTS PERFORMED THE OTHER DAY WHEN HE ENCOURAGED GOE TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO JORDANIANS.

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4. IN FINAL ANALYSIS, IN MY JUDGMENT, KEY TO PROGRESS ON PEACE FRONT DEPENDS MORE ON COURAGE AND DETERMINATION OF A MAN LIKE SADAT TO BREAK WITH ARAB CONSENSUS WHEN HE NEEDS TO, THAN ON HIS SOLICITUDE IN KEEPING IT WITH HIM. WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO CONDUCT OURSELVES VIS-A-VIS AN ARAB CONSENSUS OBJECTIVE SO AS NOT TO RESTRAIN SADAT FROM TAKING THE RISKS WE KNOW HE WILL HAVE TO TAKE IF HE IS TO LEAD THE ARABS TOWARD A PEACE SETTLEMENT. IN BRIEF, OUR SIGHTS SHOULD BE SET ON HELPING MOBILIZE CONSENSUS BEHIND RESULTS OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WHEN (AND IF) THAT TIME COMES, RATHER THAN IN ADVANCE OF IT.

5. FINALLY, AS WILL BE SEEN FROM REPORT OF MY TALK WITH SAUD, I TOOK LINE WITH HIM THAT WE WERE ALL FOR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE MODERATE ARAB CONSENSUS WITH ONE RESERVATION -- THAT IT NOT BE ACHIEVED AT COST OF NOT GIVING SADAT'S INITIATIVE AND OUR PRESENT EFFORTS EVERY CHANCE TO SUCCEED OVER NEXT COUPLE OF MONTHS.SUDDARTH

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NNN

## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ARABS, BRIEFING MATERIALS, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, SUMMIT MEETINGS, PEACE PLANS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS  
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**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
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